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Abstract
This review critically discusses the theoretical models of discounting through a selection of papers. 
It  will  focus  on  the  comparison  between  the  two  major  models,  namely discounted  utility  and 
hyperbolic  discounting.  This  paper  differs  from  previous  surveys  in  the  attention  given  to  the 
interpretation of  models and  suggestions  for  future  research.  First,  it  stresses  how  the  economics 
literature is biased itself, since it considers only present-biased preferences on the basis of not well 
grounded evidence, while also future-biased preferences are worthwhile of attention to address relevant 
issues,  like  compulsive  behaviors  and  work-life  unbalance.  Second,  it  makes  qualifications  on  the 
meaning of self-awareness, distinguishing between cognitive boundaries and beliefs. Third, it suggests 
future direction of research to address this issue, fundamental for a sound policy analysis, by showing 
how the two main welfare criteria used in the literature to evaluate welfare of inconsistent individuals 
(long-run utility and Pareto criterion) have relevant shortcomings. Finally, it proposes a new perspective 
on misprediction of utility based on time perception.
JEL No. A12, D11, D90.
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Who would prefer one hundred Euros to one hundred twenty, if they were delivered at the same 
moment? It is not a hazard to speculate that no one would. On the contrary, if one were asked to 
choose between an earning of one hundred Euros now and a higher sum next year, for instance one 
hundred twenty Euros, many people would be indifferent or would prefer the one hundred Euros 
offer. This fact suggests that individual choice is dependent on time peculiarities.
Economics  has  been  explaining  this  phenomenon  mainly  by  models  of  discounting.  In  these
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where  ) ( i t c u  represents the per period cardinal utility function of the individual and D(i) represents a 
discounting function, which associates to each time i  a weight, attached to each per period utility 
function.
For example, in the so called discounted utility model (DU, Samuelson, 1934), the specification of 
D(i) is the following exponential function:
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Thus, assuming that  ) ( i t c u  is linear in the amounts considered, in the initial example people who 
are indifferent between 100 Euros now and 120 Euros next year exhibit a discount rate  =0.2.
Nevertheless, [2] is just one among the possible specifications of D(i). Indeed, behind its formal 
elegance, the DU model bears many shortcomings, from the point of view of both normative and 
descriptive validity. In addition, psychological foundations and evidence do not seem to support heavily 
the DU model. Finally, there are several ways other than discounting in which time can influence 
individual behavior. 
Excellent surveys about intertemporal choice and departures from the standard rational choice 
model already  exist in  the  economics literature.  In  a very comprehensive  review on  intertemporal Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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choice Frederick et al. (2002) examine the major characteristics of DU model, existing anomalies with 
respect to it and models addressing them, provide an historical framework, discuss both experimental 
and  field  evidence and techniques for  measuring  discounting.  Tirole  (2002)  concisely  reviews  and 
discusses  the  major  departures  to  rational  choice  models,  giving  particular  attention  to  rational 
ignorance, memory, willpower and personal rules. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) review and extend 
the  main  results  on  quasi-hyperbolic  discounting  by  means  of  simple  models.  From  a  different 
perspective,  Frey  and  Stutzer  (2006)  consider  the  interrelation  between  utility  misprediction  (as 
individual  errors)  and  happiness  research  to  empirically  evaluate  people  well-being,  suggesting 
applications  to  smoking,  obesity  and  watching  TV  .  Finally,  Della  Vigna  (2007)  widely  surveys 
anomalies in decision making focusing on field experiments.
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  discuss  models  of  discounting,  with  a  particular  focus  on the 
comparison between the two major models: discounted utility and hyperbolic discounting. I am not 
surveying evidence on this models for two reasons: first, the reader can refer to excellent works as 
Frederick et al. (2003) and Della Vigna (2007); secondly, empirical results on intertemporal choice are 
not convergent in time and across studies (Frederick et al., 2003), suggesting that a deductive approach 
to the problem based on everyday observation is still valid and useful. 
This paper differs from previous surveys in the attention given to interpretation of models. First, it 
stresses how this literature is biased itself, since it considers only present-biased preferences on the 
basis of not well grounded evidence. On the contrary, I will argue that future-biased preferences are 
also  worthwhile  of  attention  and  that  research  on  this  topic  could address  important  topics,  e.g. 
compulsive behaviors and work-life balance. Second, it makes qualifications on the meaning of self-
awareness, distinguishing between cognitive boundaries and beliefs. Finally, it suggests future direction 
of research to address this issue, so much important for policy analysis, showing that the two main 
welfare criteria used in the literature to evaluate welfare of inconsistent individuals (long-run utility and 
the Pareto criterion) have relevant shortcomings.
I will proceed as follows. In section 1 I will show how time can affect individual choice and discuss
whether discounting is an independent construct or whether it is confounded with other factors. In 
section 2 I will compare the DU, HD and quasi-HD models, introducing future-biased preferences. In 
section  3  I  will  discuss  self-awareness, its  role  in  misprediction  of  utility  and  criteria  for  welfare 
evaluation. In section 4 I will conclude with further suggestions for future research. Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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1 Factors influencing intertemporal choice
Time can affect individual choice in several ways. They can be sorted in two categories, depending 
whether they influence the expected amount of future utility or the weight of utility per se (Frederick et al.
2002). According to Frederick (1999), the expected amount of future utility can be influenced by 
1) Probability: if the probability of the occurrence of an event which confers utility depends on 
time, then it is reasonable to evaluate differently the utility conferred to the same event at 
different  in  time  points. Thus  the  maximization  function  can  be  written  as  
) ( ) ( ... ) ( ) ( 0 0 T T
t c u c p c u c p U    [3]
The probability can be increasing or decreasing with time. A special role can be played by the 
probability of being alive (see section 1.3).
2) Characteristic of the consumed good: time can affect the characteristic of the good itself. A classic 
example is aging of wine or whisky. A correct formulation of the problem would take into 
account the characteristics of the good as follows:
)) ( ( ) ( ... )) ( ( 0 t c u c p t c u U T T
t    [4]
3) Changes in  the  utility  function:  the  consumption of  a good  can  confer  different  utility due  to 
different taste changes.
1 For a classical discussion of the role of stable preferences see Stigler 
and Becker (1977). For instance, if I have just started learning Russian, the utility deriving from 
reading War and Peace it is going to be much lower with respect to the utility I would have after 
twenty years of study as a Russian – English translator:
) ( ... ) ( 0 0 T T
t c u c u U    [5]
As Frederick (1999) notices, this holds also on smaller time scale, as the consumption of goods 
depends on the level of recent consumption (see section 1.2 for a discussion of connection 
between diminishing marginal utility and discounting).
4) Anticipation: the anticipation of the occurrence of an event that provides future utility can confer 
itself utility or disutility in the present. It is possible to enjoy the anticipation of a negative event 
(e.g. the last days of vacation before going back to school (Frederick, 1999)) or to suffer waiting 
for a positive events (e.g. waiting for a date). Sometimes anticipation can confer greater utility 
                                                
1 For a classical discussion of the role of stable preferences see Stigler and Becker (1977).Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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than the event itself.
2 It is important to distinguish between the utility conferred by anticipating 
the events and the change in utility derived from changing current consumption, because of the 
integration of expected future utility in consumption choice. Anticipation can also cause to 
delay or anticipate the consumption of the good.
) ( ... )) ( ),... ( , ( 1 0 0 T T T
t c u c u c u c u U    [6]
5) Memory: The explanation advanced by Frederick (1999) to observation that people would like to 
enjoy a thing sooner, because they are going to enjoy its memory in the future for an higher 
number of years, seems quite weak. Memory is likely to change future consumption when the 
future utility deriving from memory is integrated in current choice. This is mainly done between 
consumption of goods that can keep track of memory, e.g. taking photos or writing a diary. For 
instance, every time we take a picture of a sunset we weight the pleasure of looking at the 
sunset without being bothered to pick up the camera with the utility we will experience in the 
future by looking at the photo and recalling that sunset. The intertemporal utility function 
taking into account the memory can be written as:
)) ( ),... ( , ( ... ) ( 1 0 0 0     T T T
t c u c u c u c u U [7]
6) Opportunity costs If instead of consuming goods we save money and invest it, a certain amount 
today can be exchanged for a higher amount in the future. For example, if you invest 100 Euros 
today at a market rate of 10%, next year you will have 110 Euros. Of course, this holds true 
only if the investment is effective, otherwise there is no reason for discounting its future value:
) ,..., , ( ... ) ( 1 0 0 0     investment investment c u c u U T T
t [8]
The last way in which time can influence choice is time discounting.
3 Time discounting pertains to the 
weight given to the entire per period utility function. The formulation of a discounting model is based 
on none of the preceding reasons. What is postulated in any model of discounting, be it exponential or 
not exponential, is that  the same good, coeteribus paribus (no change in utility function, not conferring 
utility from memory or anticipation neither having characteristics depending on time and being certain 
in consumption), confers less utility if consumed in the future rather than in the present.
                                                
2 A more extreme, but valuable, perspective, is given, for example, by Giacomo Leopardi, one of the most important 
Italian poets, who argues in his “Village’s Saturday” that enjoyment can be experienced only in the anticipation of 
events, not in the event itself. Interestingly, Piera degli Esposti, an Italian theatre actress, proposed a humoristic 
perspective on Leopardi’s poem, based on backward induction logic: if enjoyment can be experienced only in the 
anticipation, then Saturday’s enjoyment can be experienced only on Friday, and Friday only on Thursday, and so on.
3 Of course all these factors can be combined. For example, time influences tasting wine by modifying the flavor of the 
good and providing utility from anticipation the sommelier waiting to taste an old wine. But also the decision of 
opening a certain aged bottle can be influenced by impatience.Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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There is no agreement on the nature of time discounting. Historically, the existence of discounting has 
been  motivated  by  a  series  of  psychological  and  non  psychological  reasons  (for  a  summary  see 
Frederick et al. 2003) which influence the intertemporal behavior: the uncertainty of life, the prospect of 
immediate consumption, the self-restraint and the bequests motive (Rae, 1934), the anticipation of 
future utility (Jevons, W. 1888), the role of abstinence (Senior, 1836), the ability of foresight and, last 
but not least, fashion (Fisher, 1930). The recent economics literature justifies discounting on the basis 
of  an intertemporal  multiple-selves  perspective:  the  individual  is  made  up  of  several  selves,  each
following the other on the time line. Discounting is therefore justified on the basis of the psychological 
connectedness  among  these persons  and is  seen  as  a  form  of  intra-personal  altruism
4.  In  this 
perspective, the weight attached by Self i to the utility of the other future selves is analogous to the 
weight she attaches to other people. The discounting function D is usually decreasing in i, but as we will 
see in section 2.1.3, there is no particular reason for not considering non-monotonic discounting.
While discounting models have been widely used since Fisher (1930) and Samuelson (1937), there is 
lack of strong evidence in supporting them. Frederick et al. (2002) advance doubts on the existence of 
the “discounting construct”, and on the basis of Lowenstein (2001) propose to step back to the seminal 
19
th century  literature  and  “unpack”  time  preference  in  three  constituent  motives:  impulsivity, 
compulsivity and inhibition. Thus, justification for discounting has been found among psychological 
factors. 
Nevertheless, some authors link discounting to decreasing marginal utility and probability. We will 
now briefly review and comment on these perspectives.
1.1 Discounting and decreasing marginal utility
Consider the following example. An individual’s linear per period utility function has the form u=x, 
where x is the amount of money he can earn. Let’s consider the functional form [1] and the discounting 
function [2]. If the individual is indifferent between 100 Euros and 200 Euros one year hence, this 
means that his discount rate is 100%. On the contrary, suppose that the utility function is concave, and 
not  linear, for  example  it  has the  form
2 / 1 x u  .  In  this case,  if  the  individual  is  again indifferent 
between  100  and  200  Euros,  then  the  discount  rate  is  no  more 100%.  Since  10 ) 100 (  u and 
2 10 ) 200 (  u ,  2 10
1
1









implies  41 . 0   .  Thus,  even  if  from  an  observational 
perspective the “discount” rate in both cases is 100%, in the second case only 41% is to ascribe to time
                                                
4 This view comes from the work of the philosopher Derek Parfit (Parfit, 1971).Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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discounting, while the remaining part depends on the concavity assumption. Moreover, diminishing 
marginal  utility works  also  if  the  two  choices  are  not  sequential  in  time, differently  from  time 
discounting.
Opposite to this view, Rachlin (1992) explains diminishing marginal utility as a direct consequence of 
discounting. For example, if a person eats one apple every five minutes, the tenth apple would be eaten 
45 minutes afterwards and its utility value would be discounted with respect to that of the first apple. 
Rachlin (1992) argues also that physiological satiation is not sufficient to explain decreasing marginal 
utility, since, in presence of satiation without discounting, everyone would space consumption so as to 
maximize his utility and diminishing marginal utility would not be observed. Firstly, this argument is 
weak, because usually is not possible to space out consumption at pleasure. Secondly, Rachlin (1992) 
recognizes that discounting could not account for all kinds of diminishing marginal utility (for example, 
quantity  of  sugar  in  a  cup  of  tea).  Thirdly,  the  argument is  quite  circular,  since  Rachlin  assumes 
discounting  as  an empirical  fact,  while  there is  no  agreement whether the  construct  of  pure  time 
discounting exists or whether it is a derivative phenomenon. Anyway, this discussion suggests that, 
when specifying examples like the one at the beginning of this paper there would be the need to specify 
preference orderings without discounting.
1.2 Discounting and life expectancy
Probability,  in  the  particular  form  of  life  expectation,  could  be  considered  as  the  base  for 
discounting  (Stange  and  Summer,  1978).  Apart  from  the  correct  Frederick  (1999,  fn  5)  technical 
criticisms of  their  approach, a  probability  function  of  survival  can  be  used  as well  in  place  of  a 
discounting function. If we include probability considerations maximizing the expected value of the 
intertemporal utility function, it is reasonable to include the probability of being alive and of enjoying 
utility.
If  the  source  of  discounting  would  be  probability,  then  discounting  could  not  be  anymore 
considered irrational anymore (see section 3.2.2).
2 Models of discounting: exponential and hyperbolic
Several economics models have been written to explain how time influences choice, mainly in a 
deductive way starting from introspection and everyday life. The majority of the economics literature 
uses of the DU model because of its appeal and tractability, but the discounting function in equation [2] Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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can  assume  other  different  forms. The  most widespread  alternative  to  exponential  discounting  is 
hyperbolic discounting. In section 2.1 I will point out characteristics of the two models, and in section 
2.2 I will show peculiarities of exponential discounting and in section 2.3 peculiarities of hyperbolic 
discounting.
2.1 Exponential and hyperbolic models, shared features
The class of models that assumes either exponential or hyperbolic discounting is characterized by 
different features. The first one is the underlying idea that the individual is made up of different selves. 
By metaphor, a person is analogue to a relay team, in which after his run each player passes the baton 
to the following player. This idea is often implicit in exponential models and explicit in hyperbolic 
discounting models. Then, in equation [2], U can be thought as the utility of person t (self t), which is 
influenced by the utility of other people (self t+1, self t+2…). Therefore, this model can be viewed as a 
particular model of altruism, in which the index of the per period utility function not only represents a 
different person, but also the time at which the person lives. Then, the discounting function values are 
the weights given to the other future people. As a consequence, the less the present person takes care
of each of them, the more distant in the future the person “lives”.
The second characteristic common to the two models is that, continuing the metaphor, all players
are twins. In other terms, the per period utility function is stationary (and concave). Interestingly, even 
the discounting function is stationary (this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for consistency, 
as we will see). 
In addition, both models imply that the discount function is independent of what the person is 
going to discount: the discount function for apples is not different from the discount function for 
pears. Another feature shared by the two discount functions is that the discount rate   is positive in 
both models.
Lastly, in both models when the individual suddenly faces a new option of choice, he recalculates all
his consumption profile taking into account of the new option, and chooses it only if the overall 
intertemporal utility is greater than integrating the option in his basket.
2.2 The DU model
The DU utility model has been described by equations [2] and [3]. Equation [2] can be expressed in 
continuous time as followsLuca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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but for easiness I will refer to equations [2] and [3]. The most important feature of the DU model is 
that it implies time consistency. Function [3] is stationary and the discount rate   is constant, since the 
ratio D(i)/D(i+1) is constant, which implies  ) ,..., ( , T t i i      . Stationary discounting and constant 
discounting rate are necessary and sufficient conditions for time consistent preferences (Frederick et al.
2003). In the framework of a multiple selves approach, this means that later selves respect planned 
future choices of earlier selves. In other words, it is as if each runner’s baton contained instructions for 
the other player on how to run his quarter and the other player followed strictly those instructions. Said 
it plain, the individual is going to do everything he earlier planned to do. This happens because with 
constant  discounting  a  parallel  shift  in  the  dates  of  two  events  can  not  influence  the  preference 
accorded to them. An alternative way to look at consistency is given by this example. Suppose to ask 
me any day if this evening I prefer to listen to a live classical concert or to attend a basketball match. 
Suppose also that I am indifferent to the two options. Then you ask me my preference between a live 
classical concert one evening and a basketball match a week later and I answer that I prefer going to the 
music  concert.  In  the  DU model  it  is  not  important  when this  choice  is  made.  You  can  ask  my 
preference on December 10, 2008 or on March 27, 2020 and the answer is going to be the same. A way 
to express my preferences formally, calling X the option “to go to classical concert” and Y “to go to 
basketball match”, is ) ,..., ( , T t i Y X d i i     .
2.3 The hyperbolic discounting models





  ) 1 ( ) ( t t D ,  0     , 0 [10]
This function implies that the discount rate is declining over time. Thus here the discount rate is a 
function of time, the   in [10] not to be cofounded with that in [9]. Calibrating the parameter of the 
model  it  is possible  to  shape  qualitatively  different  discounting  profiles.  As   approaches  0 the 
function becomes exponential, 
t e t D
   ) ( . On the contrary, a high value of  causes the function to Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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decline sharply in the near future, while afterwards the decline will be slower. For example (Bowles, 
2004), you can be very impatient of having your next meal, but you can be less impatient at evaluating 
consequences due to global warming. The function is stationary, but the behavior of the individual is 
time inconsistent, since the discount rate is not constant. Going back to our metaphor, the instructions 
within the baton are not going to be followed by the succeeding runners. This means that a model of 
HD allows for preference reversal, too. For example, it can happen that at date t the individual prefers 
at t+10 outcome X over outcome Y, while approaching t+10 (for example, at t+8) the preference is 
reversed, becoming favorite Y over X.
Instead of using a hyperbolic discounting function, the literature on declining discounting often 
adopts a  functional  form  known  as  “quasi-hyperbolic”  function,  introduced  by  Phelps  and  Pollak 
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The characteristic of this functional form is that the discount rate between period i and period i+1
is different from the discount rate between period i+1 and period i+2, but it is constant between any two 
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 k i . Since  k i i     , that is the discount rate is 
declining with time, this kind of preferences are “present – biased” and the individual is said to be 
impatient.
Some  qualification  is  needed.  Although  it  is  rarely  explicitly  mentioned,  with  some  exception 
(Krusell, 2001), mathematically the functional form of “quasi-hyperbolic” discounting is not hyperbolic 
at all, as it can be seen simply looking at [11]. On the contrary, this functional form can be said more 
properly “quasi – geometric”, because it differs from the geometric one just for the first period. The 
function has been denominated “quasi – hyperbolic” because, for  1 0    it mimics qualitatively the 
behavior of decreasing discount rate in the hyperbolic case. The quasi- geometric function can be made 
“more  hyperbolic”  by  adding  one  or  more  parameters  in  the  functional  form  [12],  for  example 












1 i if    
1 i if     







This makes discount rates different between the first and the second period, and between the second 
and the third period, constant afterwards. On the other side, calibrating the parameter, analogously 
to  in [10], allows to shape qualitatively different discounting profiles. For small values of   , the 
decline in the discount rate is very sharp, while for   =1 the quasi-geometric discount function reduces 
to the exponential [3].
2.3.1 Future-biased preferences
The  economics  literature  has  considered  only  the  case  of  present-biased  preferences,  with
1 0    . Probably, the reason is that everyday observation concerning intertemporal choices, like 
addictions, seems to exhibit an undervaluation of future consequences. 
While, at first sight, it could be reasonable to postulate that a person weights his selves less, the 
farer in the future they are, this evidence in not well grounded. As Frederick et al. (2003) notice, the 
measure of discount rates across experiments (with real or hypothetical rewards) and field studies is 
highly variable.  Moreover, variability and methodology in measurement seem not to have improved 
along years, since the range of results has not been shrinking over time. A great part of the studies they 
examine shows a discount rate less than one, which can be consistent also with values >1.
5 Moreover, 
even though a different sample of studies show that the discounting rate on the average is declining 
with time, Read (2001) found no declining rates and two studies (Frederick, 1999 and Rubinstein, 2002) 
found increasing discount rates. 
The following Frederick (1999) statement makes clear the idea that preferences are not necessarily 
present-biased:
[The determination of] the degree of concern [a person] has for "her" future welfare might also 
depend how much she currently esteems future values and interests. She might, for example, 
ascribe more weight to "her" future welfare if she is told that she will become obsessed with 
chess. … [On the contrary] if we knew we were to be transformed into a frog, we might well 
be relatively unconcerned about further tortures applied to that frog.
                                                
5 For example, if  =1.1 and δ=0.9 , for i=1 the overall value of the discounting function is 0.99.Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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This is somehow different from changing tastes, since it is a matter of weighting future selves having 
in mind predictable changes in identity or in the budget constraint. There are many situations in which 
persons over-sacrifice their current pleasure in favor of future goals, which they weight too much. The 
feeling associate to this fact is regret. For example, many have experienced, after getting a good grade 
after an exam, the feeling that they could have studied less for the same result. As Kivetz and Keinan 
(2006) notice, the research on self-control
… is premised on the notion that people are shortsighted (myopic) and easily tempted by 
hedonic “sins,” such as overbuying (oniomania), splurging on tasty but unhealthy food, and 
indulging in luxuries … importantly suggests that people not only yield to temptation they had 
originally  planned  to  resist  but  also  subsequently  reverse  their  preference  and  regret  their 
myopic behavior. … While yielding to temptation can certainly be harmful, overcontrol and 
excessive farsightedness (hyperopia) can also have negative long-term consequences.
This overweighting of future consequences could involve central aspects of one’s life, as career 
choices and life-work balance and could be at the basis of compulsive behaviors.
The economics literature has not been to attentive to regret and future-biased preferences. To our 
knowledge, no one has treated them, even though they are explicitly mentioned by Krusell (2001) 
presenting the quasi-geometric model, and by Salaniè and Treich (2006), showing that oversaving is 
possible also for hyperbolic discounters, independently of whether preferences are future or present-
biased.
The  following  figure,  taken  from  Krusell  (2001),  shows  the  behavior  of  the  quasi-geometric 
function for 1 , 1 , 1       .Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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As the figure shows, present-biased preferences and future-biased function are not symmetric. 
2.4 Sub-additive discounting
Read (2001) explains this fact in terms of subadditive discounting. Discounting is subadditive 
when  the value of the discounting function is decreasing in the length of the unit interval, i.e. the 
calculation of discount over an interval is greater if made in two steps calculating subintervals. On 
the contrary, hyperbolic discounting is not subadditive, but additive, i.e. the discounting over an 
interval is independent of its partition. Anyway, if decision are taken from the present subadditive 
discounting is equivalent to hyperbolic discounting (Frederick et al., 2003), since from the present 
later  dates  implies  larger  intervals  of  time.  Read  (2001)  punctually  observes  that  subadditive 
discounting can be the source for hyperbolic discounting and that both hyperbolic and subadditive 
discounting can be at work. Noticeably, in his experiments he does not find declining rates and 
suggests to drop HD as a model of human behavior. 
2.5 Summary
Up to now we have seen how the DU and the HD discounting models share several features but, 
holding the hypothesis of rationality (i.e. maximizing behavior) the HD discounting model introduces
qualitative  possibilities  in  economics  models via  non-constant  discounting  rate:  inconsistency  of 
behavior,  misprediction  of  utility  and  identity.  The  following  sections  explore  the  role  of  self-
knowledge and identity in consumer maximization problems. 
3 Utility misprediction and self-knowledge: naivete, partial naivete and sophistication.
Economics models of HD assume that there is an objective “someone” and a “someone” believed 
to be. Then, the choices are undertaken by a person on the basis of the preferences he believes to have, 
but  the  utility  he  experiences depends  on  your  objective  utility  function. This  often  results  in 
misprediction of utility. In reality, HD could be just one among several sources of misprediction of 
utility (see Frey, 2006; Frederick et al. 2003; Read, 2001).Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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In  the  framework  of  quasi-HD  models, people  are  perfectly  aware  of  their  per  period  utility 
function. This means, for example, that if a person’s utility functions is homogeneous and accounts 
from memory (see [6]) , at time t, relatively to all the other goods at t+1, he correctly forecasts how much he 
is going to enjoy watching at his vacation pictures at time t+1. What he does not know exactly of 
yourself is the value of the parameters of his discounting function. Thus, the right interpretation of the 
quasi-hyperbolic model (but also of DU) is that people look at future utility in a diminished scale, but 
without modifying the relative gains in utility each good confers in the future.
Thus, the individual is associated to a couple of parameters  ) ˆ , (   , where the first is the “true” 
value of the parameter, while the “hat” is the value the individual believes the parameter has. Thus, self-
knowledge can be usefully represented in the  ) ˆ , (   space, as in the following figure.
Individuals  can  be  grouped  in  four  sets:  time  consistent with ˆ = =1 (point  [1,  1]);  naïf,  with 
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point [1, 1]); partial naïf with 1 ˆ ˆ       .
6 It is noteworthy that also individuals with 1   can have a 
believed value  1 ˆ   , meaning that they are in a measure “time hypochondriac”. The partial naïf can 
either undervalue or overvalue its true problem.
3.1 The maximization problem
The way in which the individual solve his maximization problem depends on whether  1 ˆ   or 
1 ˆ   .
3.1.1 Sophistication, partial naivete and partial sophistication
In the first case,  1 ˆ   , the individual believes not to be time consistent, and that he can predict 
what his future selves are going to do. Then, he is a sophisticate and solves the problem by backward 
induction (or, equivalently, he finds a subgame-perfect equilibrium in a game among the selves). The 
major effect of sophistication is to make future selves choices consistent with earlier selves. As we will 
see in the next section about welfare evaluation, having a sophisticate behavior does not necessarily 
imply  an  improvement  in  individual’s  welfare.  Moreover,  the  effects  of  sophistication  depend on 
whether the individual is a partial naïf (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2002) and on the characteristics of the 
economic environment.
As O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) suggest, this approach is not very realistic, since also very aware 
people can have cognitive problems at solving all the round of backward induction and knowing how 
their preferences look like in the last period. Moreover, as for example Diamond and Koszegi (2003) 
notice studying the effect of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on retirement decision, when the number of 
periods is large, the individual often faces a very complicated intertemporal consumption schedule and 
it  is  not  possible  to  say  something  general  about  the  equilibrium  path.  To  address  this  issue,
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) suggest adopting a boundedly rational approach according to whom the 
individual performs just a small number of periods of backward induction. Thus, for example, the 
individual  considers  preferences  in  t+2 and  hence  starts  the  backward  induction.  Therefore,  this 
approach eliminates what they call “sophistication effects of higher order”, meaning that the individual 
does not  take into  account the reaction of  Self t+2 to  behavior  of future selves. In addition, the 
                                                
6 In fact the naïf set is a subset of the partial naïf set.Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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individual needs to choose how often to compute again his consumption path. We could call this 
behavior partial sophistication.
The partial naïf solves the problem exactly in the same way as the sophisticate, but since he has a 
wrong belief about his value  of  ,  he fails to predict the  utility his future  selves will  experience, 
believing that they will behave like the sophisticate, but with a parameter  ˆ. Of course, individuals can 
be partial naives and partial sophisticates at the same time.
3.1.2 Naivete and time consistence
In the second case,  1 ˆ   , each self t maximizes in a straight way the following intertemporal utility 
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believing that his future  selves will  be consistent  with his choices. If  1   , they will and the 
behavior of the individual will be time consistent. If  1   , they will not, and the individual will exhibit a 
naïf behavior, not taking into account any strategic consideration (because the naïf believes his future 
selves will be consistent with his choices).
A feature of this framework, usually not explicitly addressed, is that either future selves have no 
memory or there is no possibility of learning. Self t thinks that all his future selves will be consistent 
with  him,  although  all  his  former  selves  were  not  consistent  with  earlier  selves.  This  is  in  fact  a 
commonly  observed  behavior,  e.g.  when people  claim  that  tomorrow  they  will  give  up  smoking, 
although they said it thousand of times in the past without giving it up.
7
To  conclude this  section,  a qualification  on  the  interpretation  of  naivete  and  sophistication  is 
needed. In fact, in this model people are naïf only with respect to the value of their  . They way in 
which they solve the maximization problem (backward induction or straight solution) is a consequence 
of  having  a  certain  belief   ˆ,  which  in  the  case  1   implies consistency  of  all  future  selves. 
Nevertheless, if the same naïf person were told to be in error, and that her value  1 ˆ   , she would 
                                                
7 Another famous example is taken from “Zeno’s Cosciousness” by Italo Svevo, where the protagonist writes many 
times on the calendar “L.S” beside date of the day after, meaning “last cigarette”.Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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maximize in the same way as sophisticates. Implicitly, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) do not share this 
idea, since they suggest interpreting partial sophistication as an approximation of the naïf behavior. 
Future research should keep separate naivete arising from bounded rationality to naivete arising from 
misbelieves about  one’s  preferences: self-control problems  arising  from  cognitive  problems  at 
forecasting future behaviors could be addressed by very different policies from those aimed at solving 
self control problems arising from a scarce knowledge of preferences.
3.2 Criteria for individual welfare evaluation
The HD discounting framework is good at describing in a more realistic way people’s behavior, 
while the analysis on the normative side is much more weaker. The two main criteria used in the 
economic  literature  are  the  long-run  utility  and  the  Pareto  criterion,  but  both  bear  important 
shortcomings.
The long-run utility criterion adopts as optimal benchmark for welfare Self 0 utility valued at the 
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The idea underlying choice of long-run utility is that discounting is rational (see a short discussion 
in section 3.2.2). The reasons to prefer this approach to welfare evaluation is preferred are several. 
Firstly, it is justified if decisions of the kind “I will quit smoking at time i” are repeated, because each 
earlier-than-i self has to agree on the statement. For example, all selves before i usually agree at quitting 
smoking, but Self i does not care and keep on smoking (Koszegi, 2005; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006).
Secondly, some authors consider departures from DU as mistakes (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; 
Koszegi, 2005; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, 2006). On the contrary, 
Frederick et al. (2003) question the fact that DU “anomalies” are mistakes. This is to our knowledge an 
open field of research with respect to hyperbolic discounting. There is some experimental research on 
this topic which investigates departure DU other than HD (magnitude effect, Frederick and Read, 
2002; preference for improving sequences, Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991) and supports the idea 
that departures from DU are not anomalies and have normative value.Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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Thirdly, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) found that the closer the consumption level of future selves to 
that planned by earlier selves, the higher the discounted utility is for all selves. This idea connects the 
long-run utility to Pareto optimality, too.
The Pareto criterion applied to intertemporal choice (Goldman, 1980; Laibson 1997) states that the 
normative benchmark for welfare analysis is given by the consumption schedule preferred by all selves.
The Pareto criterion is importantly weak, since in the case of multiplicity of equilibria there is the need 
to introduce another criterion to discriminate among them, and which does not allow ranking of Pareto 
optimal outcomes.
Nevertheless, the Pareto criterion overcomes a shortcoming of long-run utility criterion: since the 
same individual evaluates his well being differently at different points in time, in general there is no 
particular reason to consider Self 0 instead of Self i utility as the benchmark. In fact, for each self, his 
current choices are  maximizing.  Considering the same example in O’Donoghue and Rabin  (2002), 
suppose that now the discounted utility of watching Sleepy Hollow tomorrow is equal to “2”, lower 
than that of watching Ed Wood the day after, equal to “3”. When tomorrow the individual is deciding 
whether to spend his money to watch Sleepy Hollow this evening or Ed Wood the following evening, it 
happens that, due to proximity, Sleepy Hollow confers him a utility equal to “4” and his preference 
reverses. Not only the choice is reversed, but also, in absolute value, he is going to enjoy Sleepy Hollow 
more than his yesterday self predicted he would have enjoyed Ed Wood. Thus, why should his idea of 
enjoyment today be used to value tomorrow choices?
To answer these important shortcomings of both Pareto and long-run criteria, probably useful 
suggestions could be found by considering criteria adopted in other field of research, e.g.. bioethics, 
investigating other domain of choice in which facts are apparently more clear cut, as it is for suicide or 
serious  illnesses.  The  typical  example  is  that  of  Ulysses-and-the-Sirens  kind,  namely  at  time  t the 
individual writes down that at t+1 in case of serious disease that makes him loose the fundamental 
human capabilities he will go on living, while at t+1 he declares that he wants stop living. What Self 
should be taken into consideration at evaluating welfare? Do previous choices count more than present 
choices? And if so, why? For a bioethical approach to the problem, among different approaches, see 
Beauchamp and Childress (2008).
3.2.1 The role of self-awareness
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2000) show that, when considering simple choice environments
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for  pleasurable activities, while  it  mitigates  misbehavior  for  onerous ones. The  naïf  behavior  is 
symmetric, while the partial naïf behavior is characterized by a hedge value of  ˆ , under which the 
partial naïf behaves like a sophisticate and over   ˆ like a naïf (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2002).
On the contrary, in more complex environments, the effect of awareness is not so straightforward. 
In a simple three-period consumption-saving example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) show that for 
three  different  CRRA  utility  functions  the  effects  of  sophistication  (and  partial  naivete)  are  not 
straightforward. In particular, in one case it exacerbates over-consumption, in the other it mitigates it 
and in the third case it has no effect. Within the CRRA family, the entity of the effects of awareness is 
decreasing in the level of relative risk aversion. Risk aversion determines their direction, too: if it is less 
than one, awareness worsen over-consumption; if it is more than one, it mitigates over-consumption, 
while if the function is logarithmic, it has neutral effects (Pollack,1968).
From  a  different  perspective,  Tirole  (2002)  considers  an  agent  who  has  to decide  whether  to 
perform a simple task and can acquire information at no cost. Also in this case information about one’s 
characteristic does not necessarily have a positive value. Indeed, the quasi-HD model allows the agent 
to decide to be rationally ignorant.
3.2.2 Is discounting rational?
So far I have taken for granted that discounting, be it DU or HD, is rational. Frederick (1999) lists 
many authors (among them: Jevons (1888), Pigou (1920), Rawls (1971), Ramsey (1928)) contending the 
rationality of discounting. Stigler and Becker (1997) show that their discussion of stable preferences 
implies  no  discounting,  and  question  the  importance  of  time  preference.  Without  entering  the 
discussion, it must be noted that the rational basis for discounting depends on its source (psychological 
myopia or other). For example, if discounting is a construct derivative life expectancy (see section 1.2)
it can be well considered rational.
In the case in which discounting would not be rational, the intertemporal utility function with no 
time preference should be used as an optimal benchmark. Nevertheless, so far the DU utility model has 
been taken as the normative benchmark for welfare analysis.Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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4 Concluding remarks and future research
The aim of this paper was to make some qualification on the existing literature on intertemporal 
choice, with  a particular  focus on  discounting models.  I  chose  to  survey  (hyperbolic)  discounting 
models  because,  notwithstanding  their  shortcomings,  they  are  parsimonious  in  not  explaining 
phenomena  with  ad  hoc extensions  (as  many  models  do  introducing  new  arguments  in  the  utility 
function),  and in leaving  room for normative  analysis. Besides, they are  not a mere  translation of 
psychological literature in economics.
I  discussed  whether  discounting  can  be  seen  as  independent  construct,  or  whether  it  can  be 
derivative  of  other  factors,  stressing  the  role  that  life  expectancy  can  play  and  the  distinction  of 
discounting from decreasing marginal utility. After comparing the major features shared by hyperbolic 
discounting and discounted utility models and their peculiarities, I discussed the introduction of future-
biased preferences in order to extend the existing literature on self-control to “economics of regret”. 
Then, I qualified the role played by self-awareness. I distinguished the misprediction of utility due to 
bounded rationality from that due to bad knowledge of preferences, suggesting that the nature of 
misprediction is an important factor at evaluating policies. I then concisely examined the two major 
criteria  for  welfare  evaluation  of  inconsistent  agents,  namely  the  long-run  utility  and  the  Pareto 
criterion. Since these criteria bear important shortcomings, I suggested that they should be seriously 
challenged by future research if the literature on intertemporal choice is aimed at providing useful 
policy indications. In fact, evaluation of people welfare has been a difficult issue also in other domains, 
e.g. medicine now faces many bioethical issues. A possible direction of future research could look at 
how bioethics solved (or tried to solve) individual welfare analysis. Such a comparative analysis could 
suggest useful criteria for evaluating welfare also in the economic choice domain. Finally, I analyzed the 
role played by self-knowledge, showing how information on oneself does not always have a positive 
value. Future research should address when information has a positive or negative impact on people 
welfare: is the normative statement “know thyself” valid only  when entering Delphi’s temple?
To conclude this paper, I suggest a radical departure from models of discounting that anyway can 
be entailed in this framework. The literature on discounting is based on the premise on the fact that 
individuals are myopic or hyperopic at evaluating future utility. The fact that people can be myopic or 
hyperopic in time perception itself is never mentioned, but everyone has perceived at least once time as 
never passing (e.g. when listening to a boring classical music concert) or as passing too fast (e.g. on 
vacation). Along the same line it is common perception in life  that years are passing faster when one Luca Savorelli - Self Awareness and Utility Misprediction in Discounting Models of Intertemporal Choice
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gets older with respect to youth and childhood. This “subjective” time perception can be as well the 
source  of  misprediction  of  utility,  if  discounting  is  based  on dishomogenous time  intervals. For 
example, tomorrow Sleepy Hollow show can seem closer than one day if tomorrow is a vacation day 
rather than if tomorrow is a working day. Economics could embed its techniques of multiple selves 
analysis on the important work of the 21
st century philosopher Henry Bergson, Time and free will. In his 
work Bergson (1889) explains human being as a two selves construct: the first Self, which regards time 
as homogenous, is a “shadow” Self of the real Self, which regards time as 
…a real duration whose heterogeneous moments permeate each other; below the numerical 
multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity: below Self with well-defined states, a 
Self in which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming an organic 
whole…The Self thus refracted and thereby broken to pieces is much better adapted to the 
requirements of social life in general and language in particular: consciousness prefers it, and 
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